1.   In this case we have the simple result that the preferences of the median voter are Decisive.

2.   The median voter model can be applied directly to yield predictions about the determinants of public expenditure.

3.   The wage is set by the union executive to maximize the expected utility of the median voter.

4.   We therefore explicitly model the union wage-setting process in a median voter framework.

5.   Any such level of output will put the median voter on a higher indifference curve than would the reversion level.

6.   This, again, would mean that output is greater than preferred by the median voter when this institutional constraint does not apply.

7.   The most preferred expenditure level of the median voter increases to.

8.   In this case, there is no increase in spending as a result of an increase in the level of income of the median voter.

9.   The tax price to the median voter is P m.