51.   The Official Receiver would remain the last resort for troubled financial institutions.

52.   The program sets up two new agencies to supervise and manage assets of troubled financial institutions.

53.   The president, Tetsufumi Horie, maintains that the bank was not responsible for the mismanagement of the two troubled institutions.

54.   The second stage calls for transforming the most troubled institutions from state-run- to state-owned enterprises operating under a public bank holding company.

55.   A guarantee by the government on the loans would allow the central bank to provide special loans, without accruing excessive risk from the troubled institutions.

56.   Many troubled financial institutions and firms have been bailed out, despite criticism some of the funds were wasted on ineligible companies due to inadequate appraisals and hazy management.

57.   The Bank of Japan had previously insisted that no public funds would be used to rescue troubled financial institutions.