41.   More recently, governments have imposed financial constraints limiting the call of state enterprises on public funds.

42.   Thus the clientelistic interplay of political interests within the Spanish state under Franco converted state enterprises into part of the political patronage system.

43.   The use of state posts as a source of patronage and control was reflected in the hypertrophy of the state enterprise bureaucracy.

44.   The root of these accommodations is the bargaining power possessed by state enterprises.

45.   Increasingly, state enterprises have been able to function as an organized political lobby, despite their differences of interest.

46.   A corrective is needed, however, to the impression that state enterprise management is entirely conditioned by the political forces that impinge upon it.

47.   It was argued earlier that the role of state enterprises partly reflects the interests of social classes and groups and the way they are represented within the polity.

48.   It has been a particularly marked feature of industrial relations in state enterprises, since the conduct of industrial relations influences the achievement of a variety of state objectives.

49.   The growing political preoccupation with controlling public expenditure and limiting the role of the state has had far-reaching, if ambiguous, consequences for state enterprise industrial relations.

50.   Second, commercialism in the form of tighter financial constraints and increasing competition has created pressures on state enterprise management to cut labour costs and increase flexibility.