31.   The objectives of public enterprises mirror the complexity of the role of the state as a whole.

32.   The nature of public enterprise objectives makes it difficult for political authorities to evaluate and control the activities of the enterprises.

33.   But even if political authorities were clear about what they expected from public enterprises, political control would remain problematic.

34.   The increasing use of market proxies and targets of various kinds to control the activities of public enterprises brings problems of its own.

35.   For example, considerations of short-term electoral advantage may dictate an interest in the nature of price and pay policy in public enterprises.

36.   The specialist managerial expertise involved in running complex public utilities ensures that public enterprises are able to control the data upon which assessments are made.

37.   Public enterprises run little risk of bankruptcy, and if targets are not met, governments usually step in to cover deficits.

38.   The major formal sanction in the hands of the government is the power of appointment and dismissal over boards and chief executives of public enterprises.

39.   In addition, as argued above, there are great difficulties in assessing the performance of public enterprises.

40.   A number of writers have argued that the peculiarities of the environment in which the public enterprise operates create distinctive managerial processes.